Threat Modeling and Validation: Prove the Mitigations in Your Threat Model Work
A threat model lists what could go wrong and what should stop it. Most stay as diagrams. Hayrok takes each threat and its assumed mitigation, tests it in the running system, and checks your own SIEM, EDR, WAF and API gateway telemetry to see whether the mitigation held and whether anyone was alerted. When the system changes, the threats are tested again.
Threat Models Describe Intent. They Rarely Prove It.
Teams invest in threat modeling, then ship. The mitigations get built, changed or skipped, and the model is never checked against what actually runs.
Models age with every release
The diagram shows last quarter's design. The code has moved on.
Mitigations are assumed, not proven
"mTLS between services" is written down. Nobody checked the new service has it.
Detection is rarely in the model
Models say what should stop an attack, not whether anyone would see it.
Every Threat, Its Mitigation, and What Actually Happened
Threats imported from your models, each tested inside an approved plan. Filter by outcome to see where the mitigation failed and whether detection noticed.
| TEST | MODEL | MITIGATION | EDR AND GATEWAY | SIEM |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TM-101Card metadata returned in capture errors | payments | Failed | No alert | No alert |
| TM-104Forged service call to payments-api | payments | Held | Alerted | Alerted |
| TM-109Role change via bulk API with no audit record | identity | Failed | No alert | Not logged |
| TM-112JWT claims edited client-side | identity | Held | Alerted | Alerted |
| TM-115Analyst reads raw PII from the data lake | data | Failed | Alerted late | No alert |
| TM-121Job role assumes warehouse admin | data | Held | Alerted | Alerted |
| TM-126Assistant calls refunds without approval | assistant | Held | Alerted | No alert |
| TM-133New internal service without mTLS | platform | Failed | Alerted late | No alert |
Bring the Method You Already Use, We Test What It Says
Threats can come from STRIDE sessions, attack trees, ATT&CK-based models or your own templates. Select a method to see how its threats become tests.
Spoofing and tampering
Each identity and data-integrity threat becomes a test against the service that should enforce it.
Per element in your data flow diagramRepudiation and disclosure
Audit logging and data exposure are tested by acting and checking what was recorded or returned.
Audit and response checksDenial and elevation
Resource limits are tested within safe bounds. Privilege paths are tested end to end.
Denial tests are bounded by planEach System's Model, Checked Against What Runs
Each threat model is linked to the services it describes. When those services change, the model's threats are tested again. Select a system to see its latest result.
Payments service · STRIDE · 14 threats
Validated Attack Trees, Pruned by the Right Fix
Each branch of an attack tree is tested. Branches that worked are shown with the step that let them through, so you can see which mitigation cuts the most branches. Select fixes to see which branches close.
One Model, Tested at Every Stage It Matters
A threat model is written once at design review and tested at each step after that. Select a stage to see what happens to the model's threats there.
Write the model
Threats and intended mitigations are captured at design review, in your method or template, and linked to the services they describe.
When the System Moves, the Model Knows
Hayrok compares each model with what is actually deployed and flags the differences: new endpoints, new data flows, removed controls. Mark each one to update the model and test it.
Threat Modeling and Validation FAQ
No. Threats can be imported from common methods and templates, or entered directly. Supported import formats are confirmed during planning.
Book a Demo: See Your Threat Model Tested
Bring one threat model, in any format. We will show how its threats become tests, how your telemetry is read for each one, and how the model stays tested as the system changes.